

WELCOME

Discover Security Features of Secure Vault


Jacob Johnson



Agenda

- Secure Vault Overview
- Tamper Deep Dive
 - Tamper Response
 - Tamper Source
 - Tamper Configuration
 - Usage Example
- Secure Vault Tamper Demo
- Support Documentation

IoT Attack Vectors are shifting from Remote to Local



Secure Vault



Threats evolve. So should your device security. Introducing Secure Vault.

silabs.com/security

Secure Vault – first silicon to achieve PSA Level 3 Certification





psacertified[™]


https://www.psacertified.org/products/secure-vault/

- <u>EETimes</u>
- <u>Arm Beyond The Now</u> <u>Podcast</u>
- <u>Silabs Press Release</u>

PSA Level 2&3 Requirements for Boundary Separation

Isolation level 2

Level 2 introduces an isolation boundary between the PSA Root of Trust and the Application Root of Trust.



SecureVault™

	xG2xB	
Base	Mid	High
~	✓	✓
\checkmark	✓	✓
\checkmark	\checkmark	✓
_	VSE/HSE	HSE
_	\checkmark	✓
_	\checkmark	✓
_	Optional	~
_	_	✓
_	_	✓
_	_	✓
_	_	\checkmark

True Random Number Generator
Crypto Engine

Secure Application Boot

Secure Engine

Feature

Secure Boot with RTSL

Secure Debug with Lock/Unlock

DPA Countermeasures

Anti-Tamper

Secure Attestation

Secure Key Management

Advanced Crypto






Designing Secure IoT Devices



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Secure Engine Subsystem



All cryptographic functions use a dedicated crypto-coprocessor

- Random number generation
- Symmetric encryption/decryption
- Hashing
- Keypair generation
- Key storage
- Signing / Verifying signatures

Limited accessibility to crypto-coprocessor

- Via a Host mailbox interface
- Debug pins (with Debug Challenge Interface, or DCI)

Crypto-coprocessor is not customer programmable


(but can be securely updated)

Crypto-coprocessor benefits

- Increases security: access to crypto functions is tightly controlled, supports key isolation, supports Secure Boot
- Frees the Host Processor for other tasks




Secure Key Management



Cryptography Engine


Protocol Usage & Support



Software Only OK Hardware + CPU Better Hardware Only Best


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Secure Boot




- Vulnerabilities
 - Replacing code with 'look-alike code' makes a product appear normal. Hackers use it to copy/re-direct data to alternate servers.
- Secure Boot with RTSL (Root-of-Trust & Secure Loader)
 - Use and execute only trusted application code against immutable memory and through a full chain of trust

Anti-Rollback Prevention



- Vulnerabilities
 - Adversaries may have knowledge of a security flaw present in older firmware
- Anti-Rollback Prevention
 - Prevents older digitally signed firmware from being re-loaded into a device to re-expose patched flaws

Secure Attestation



- Vulnerabilities
 - Many systems use a UID to identify devices, but the UID is public (can be copied)
 - Developers are concerned with the authenticity of their devices
 - Most successful companies suffer counterfeit products and "ghost shifts"
- Secure Attestation
 - Secure Vault devices generate a unique device ECC keypair on-chip and securely stores the secret private key
 - The device secret private key never leaves the chip
 - During production
 - Test program reads the device public key
 - Placed in certificate & signed with an HSM secret key
 - Re-stored back in chip's OTP memory
 - External service can request the certificate chain from the device and CA web server which retrieves the unique device public key.
 - External service can perform a "Challenge Response" to the chip at any time during the life of the product to Authenticate the chip is genuine

DPA Countermeasures

LOCAL ATTACK VECTOR




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A Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attack requires hands-on access to the device.




Monitoring electromagnetic radiation and fluctuations in power consumption during crypto operations may reveal security keys and other data.



Vulnerabilities

- Observing subtle signal differences during given internal operations can provide insight into cryptographic functions
- DPA Countermeasures
 - Countermeasures add masks and random timings to internal operations and distorts DPA snooping


Secure Debug




Vulnerabilities

- Unlocked ports are a significant security vulnerability
- Unlocking debug ports typically wipes the memory to protect IP but this limits device failure analysis capabilities
- Secure Debug
 - Lock the emulation port and use optional cryptographic tokens to unlock it allowing memory to remain intact

Secure Link






Vulnerabilities

- PCB's can be easily probed potentially exposing keys, passwords and data
- Secure Link
 - Encrypts selected bus messages using a Diffie-Hellman key exchange
 - Keys are uniquely created on a 'per session/per device' basis.
 - No fleet-wide keys & new keys on each power-cycle

Anti-Tamper^(1/2)



Why


- Many attacks force a device outside its standard operating range(s)
 - temperature, voltage, clock-inputs, magnetic noise
 - Debuggers running at a high rate, reboots at a high rate
- Cost of these attacks is now low enough for both large scale and hobbyists

Silicon Labs

- Implemented an ability to detect when these attacks happen
 - Voltage, clock, temperature and magnetic tamper detectors in our devices
 - Secure boot, secure debug use counters to flag abnormal behavior
 - External triggers from broken enclosures via buttons and traces
- Implemented an ability to respond to these attacks
 - Programmable tamper response
 - Includes an ability to perform rapid deletion of Secure Key Storage (forced bricking)

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Anti-Tamper^(2/2)



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Secure Vault Tamper Response

Level	Response	Description
0	Ignore	No action is taken
1	Interrupt	 The SETAMPERHOST interrupt on the Cortex-M33 is triggered Read the SE status to check which tamper sources that have been triggered
2	Filter	 A counter in the tamper filter is increased The Filter counter tamper source is triggered if counter reaches a configurable threshold (2 to 256) within a configurable reset period (32ms to ~795.4 days)
4	Reset	 The SE and Cortex-M33 are reset Enters diagnostic mode if the tamper reset counter reaches a programmable threshold
7	Erase OTP	 Erases the OTP configuration of the device It will make the device and all wrapped secrets unrecoverable and the device will no longer be able to boot

Note:

These responses are cumulative, meaning that if a filter response is triggered, an interrupt will also be triggered

Secure Vault Tamper Source (SE Hardware)

Number	Name	Description	Default Level (Response)
0	Reserved	—	—
1	Filter counter	Filter counter reaches configured threshold value	0 (Ignore)
2	SE watchdog	Internal SE watchdog expires	4 (Reset)
3	Reserved	—	—
4	SE RAM CRC	SE RAM parity error occurs	4 (Reset)
5	SE hard fault	SE core hard fault occurs	4 (Reset)
6	Reserved	—	—

Secure Vault Tamper Source (SE Software)

Number	Name	Description	Default Level (Response)
7	SE software assertion	SE software triggers an assert	4 (Reset)
8	Reserved	—	—
9	User secure boot	Secure boot of host firmware failed	0 (Ignore)
10	Mailbox authorization	Unauthorized command received over the Mailbox interface	0 (Ignore)
11	DCI authorization	Unauthorized command received over the DCI interface	0 (Ignore)
12	Flash integrity	OTP, MTP or flash content could not be properly authenticated	4 (Reset)
13	Reserved	—	—
14	Self test	Integrity error of internal storage is detected	4 (Reset)
15	TRNG monitor	TRNG monitor detected lack of entropy	0 (Ignore)

Secure Vault Tamper Source (Hardware)

Number	Name	Description	Default Level (Response)
16 – 23	PRS0 – 7	Decouple brown-out detector threshold alert	0 (Ignore)
24	Decouple BOD	Decouple brown-out-detector threshold alert	4 (Reset)
25	Temperature sensor	On-chip temperature sensor detects temperature outside the operational conditions of the device	0 (Ignore)
26	Voltage glitch falling	Voltage glitch detector detected falling glitch	0 (Ignore)
27	Voltage glitch rising	Voltage glitch detector detected rising glitch	0 (Ignore)
28	Secure lock	Debug lock internal logic check failed	4 (Reset)
29	SE debug	SE debug granted	0 (Ignore)
30	Digital glitch	Digital glitch detector detected an event	0 (Ignore)
31	SE ICACHE	SE instruction cache checksum error	4 (Reset)

Note:

• Tamper sources 24 to 27 can operate down to EM3 whereas other tamper sources can operate down to EM1.

• Default tamper responses (> 0) are always enabled even when the device is not provisioned.


• Users may escalate the tamper response of any source but they cannot degrade the tamper response below the default Level.

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Secure Vault Tamper Configuration

Setting	Description
Tamper response levels	A response level (0, 1, 2, 4, and 7) for each tamper source (0 – 31)
Filter settings	The tamper filter counter has two settings: • Trigger threshold (0 - 7 for 2 - 256) • Reset period (0 - 31 for 32 ms - ~795.4 days)
Flags	 Digital Glitch Detector Always On (bit 1) 0 — Digital glitch detector runs when the SE is executing a command 1 — Digital glitch detector runs continually even the SE is not performing any operations
 Reset threshold The number of consecutive tamper resets (up to 255) before the part enters diagnostic mode due to tamper resets (up to 255) before the part enters diagnostic mode due to tamper resets (up to 255) before the part enters diagnostic mode due to tamper resets (up to 255) before the part enters diagnostic mode due to tamper resets (up to 255) before the part enters diagnostic mode due to tamper resets (up to 255) before the part enters diagnostic mode due to tamper resets (up to 255) before the part enters diagnostic mode due to tamper resets (up to 255) before the part enters diagnostic mode due to tamper resets (up to 255) before the part enters diagnostic mode due to tamper resets (up to 255) before the part enters diagnostic mode due to tamper resets (up to 255) before the part enters diagnostic mode due to tamper resets (up to 255) before the part enters diagnostic mode due to tamper resets (up to 255) before the part enters diagnostic mode due to tamper resets (up to 255) before the part enters diagnostic mode due to tamper resets (up to 255) before the part enters diagnostic mode due to tamper resets (up to 255) before the part enters diagnostic mode due to tamper resets (up to 255) before the part enters diagnostic mode due to tamper resets (up to 255) before the part enters diagnostic mode due to tamper resets (up to 255) before the part enters diagnostic mode due to tamper resets (up to 255) before the part enters diagnostic mode due to tamper resets (up to 255) before the part enters diagnostic mode due to tamper resets (up to 255) before the part enters diagnostic mode due to tamper resets (up to 255) before the part enters diagnostic mode due to tamper resets (up to 255) before the part enters diagnostic mode due to tamper resets (up to 255) before the part enters diagnostic mode due to tamper resets (up to 255) before the part enters diagnostic mode due to tamper resets (up to 255) before the part enters due to 255) before the part enters due to 255) before the part en	
Note: The tamper configuration is one-time programmable, this means that tamper settings must be written together with secure boot settings and are immutable after they are written.	

Usage Example



Several of the available tamper sources report internal SE errors. By default, tamper is configured to reset the device (level 4) if any of a number of these SE errors are detected.

Custom handling of internal and external tamper sources (default level 0) can be configured to trigger an interrupt (level 1) on the Cortex-M33 or increase a counter in the tamper filter (level 2).

Secure Vault Tamper Demo

Support Documentation

- AN1190: Series 2 Secure Debug
- AN1218: Series 2 Secure Boot with RTSL
- AN1247: Anti-Tamper Protection Configuration and Use
- AN1271: Secure Key Storage
- AN1268: Authenticating Silicon Labs Devices Using Device Certificates
- AN1222: Production Programming of Series 2 Devices
- UG162: Simplicity Commander Reference Guide
- UG266: Silicon Labs Gecko Bootloader User's Guide



THANK YOU



tech t>lks